“World at Risk: The Report of the Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism” select excerpts and [personal comments]. The full report can be read or downloaded at: http://www.preventwmd.com/report/
PREFACE excerpts:
The United States still wields enormous power of the traditional kind, but traditional power is less effective than it used to be. In today’s world, individuals anywhere on the planet connect instantly with one another and with information. Money is moved, transactions are made, information is shared, instructions are issued, and attacks are unleashed with a keystroke. Weapons of tremendous destructive capability can be developed or acquired by those without access to an industrial base or even an economic base of any kind, and those weapons can be used to kill thousands of people and disrupt vital financial, communications, and transportation systems, which are easy to attack and hard to defend. All these factors have made nation-states less powerful and more vulnerable relative to the terrorists, who have no national base to defend and who therefore cannot be deterred through traditional means. One of the purposes of this report is to set forth honestly and directly, for the consideration of the American people, the threat our country faces if terrorists acquire weapons of mass destruction.
[no one in the world is safe]
It is our hope to break the all-too-familiar cycle in which disaster strikes and a commission is formed to report to us about what our government should have known and done to keep us safe. This time we do know. We know the threat we face. We know that our margin of safety is shrinking, not growing. And we know what we must do to counter the risk. There is no excuse now for allowing domestic partisanship or international rivalries to prevent or delay the actions that must be taken. We need unity at all levels—nationally, locally, and among people all across the globe. There is still time to defend ourselves, if we act with the urgency called for by the nature of the threat that confronts us. Sounding that call for urgent action is the purpose of this report.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY excerpts:
…unless the world community acts decisively and with great urgency, it is more likely than not that a weapon of
mass destruction will be used in a terrorist attack somewhere in the world by the end of 2013.
…terrorists are more likely to be able to obtain and use a biological weapon than a nuclear weapon.
…“The risk of a nuclear weapon being used today is growing, not receding.” Sam Nunn
No mission could be timelier. The simple reality is that the risks that confront us today are evolving faster than our multilayered responses.
U.S. policy and strategy have made progress, they have not kept pace with the growing risks. In the area of counterterrorism, our government has innovated and implemented new initiatives since 9/11, but its focus has been mainly limited to defense, intelligence, and homeland security programs and operations. The next administration
needs to go much further, using the tools of “soft power” to communicate effectively about American intentions and to build grassroots social and economic institutions that will discourage radicalism and undercut the terrorists in danger spots around the world—especially in Pakistan…
…The Commission believes that the United States must place a greater emphasis on the prevention side of the equation…Only by elevating the priority of preventing bioterrorism will it be possible to substantially improve U.S. and global biosecurity.
RECOMMENDATION 1: [Focus on domestic control issues helpful but inadequate].
RECOMMENDATION 2: The United States should undertake a series of mutually reinforcing measures at the international level to prevent biological weapons proliferation and terrorism:
(1) press for an international conference of countries with major biotechnology industries to promote biosecurity;
(2) conduct a global assessment of biosecurity risks [this must include natures diseases as well as bioterrorist agents. Such an assessment will verify the need for raising global health standards as a means of dampening both the likely spread of natural or terrorist initiated pandemics.]
(3) strengthen global disease surveillance networks, [this holds greatest promise for establishing a global network of basic health care clinics and services as a means of early detection of outbreaks from any source.]
(4) propose a new action plan for achieving universal adherence to and effective national implementation of the Biological Weapons Convention, for adoption at the next review conference in 2011.
[International cooperation is essential but inherently lacking given expansive characteristics of biotechnology and powerlessness of international institutions. Trying to force ‘adherence’ to any standards will not be met with appreciation or voluntary compliance. What then? Sanctions which are more deadly than war…and actually contribute to conditions helpful to terrorists and natures pathogens alike?]]
RECOMMENDATION 3: The United States should work internationally toward strengthening the nonproliferation regime, reaffirming the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons by
(1) imposing a range of penalties for NPT violations and withdrawal from the NPT that shift the burden of
proof to the state under review for noncompliance;
(2) ensuring access to nuclear fuel, at market prices to the extent possible, for non-nuclear states that agree not to develop sensitive fuel cycle capabilities and are in full compliance with international
obligations;
(3) strengthening the International Atomic Energy Agency, to include identifying the limitations to
its safeguarding capabilities, and providing the agency with the resources and authorities needed to meet its current and expanding mandate;
(4) promoting the further development and effective implementation of counterproliferation initiatives
such as the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism;
(5) orchestrating consensus that there will be no new states, including Iran and North Korea, possessing uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing capability;
(6) working in concert with others to do everything possible to promote and maintain a moratorium
on nuclear testing;
(7) working toward a global agreement on the definition of “appropriate” and “effective” nuclear security
and accounting systems as legally obligated under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540; and
(8) discouraging, to the extent possible, the use of financial incentives in the promotion of civil nuclear power.
[There is some hope that the world and reduce the threat of nuclear weapons but without US leadership in disarming nuclear capacity there is little chance the world will follow. One hold out puts all at risk.]
RECOMMENDATION 4: The new President should undertake a comprehensive review of cooperative nuclear security programs, and should develop a global strategy that accounts for the worldwide expansion of the threat and the restructuring of our relationship with Russia from that of donor and recipient to a cooperative partnership. [will do nothing to reduce bio threat…may actually increase it]
RECOMMENDATION 5: As a top priority, the next administration must stop the Iranian and North Korean nuclear weapons programs. In the case of Iran, this requires the permanent cessation
of all of Iran’s nuclear weapons–related efforts. In the case of North Korea, this requires the complete abandonment and dismantlement of all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs. If, as appears likely, the next administration seeks to stop these programs through direct diplomatic engagement with the
Iranian and North Korean governments, it must do so from a position of strength, emphasizing both the benefits to them of abandoning their nuclear weapons programs and the enormous costs of failing to do so. Such engagement must be backed by the credible threat of direct action in the event that diplomacy fails.
RECOMMENDATION 6: The next President and Congress should implement a comprehensive policy toward Pakistan that works with Pakistan and other countries to
(1) eliminate terrorist safe havens through military, economic, and diplomatic means;
(2) secure nuclear and biological materials in Pakistan;
(3) counter and defeat extremist ideology; and
(4) constrain a nascent nuclear arms race in Asia.
RECOMMENDATION 7: The next U.S. administration should work with the Russian government on initiatives to jointly reduce the danger of the use of nuclear and biological weapons, including by
(1) extending some of the essential verification and monitoring provisions of the Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaty that are scheduled to expire in 2009;
(2) advancing cooperation programs such as the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, and the Proliferation Security Initiative;
(3) sustaining security upgrades at sensitive sites in Russia and elsewhere, while finding common ground on further reductions in stockpiles of excess highly enriched uranium;
(4) jointly encouraging China, Pakistan, and India to announce a moratorium on the further production of nuclear fissile materials for nuclear weapons and to reduce existing nuclear military deployments and stockpiles; and
(5) offering assistance to other nations, such as Pakistan and India, in achieving nuclear confidence-building
measures similar to those that the United States and the USSR followed for most of the Cold War.
RECOMMENDATION 8: The President should create a more efficient and effective policy coordination structure by designating a White House principal advisor for WMD proliferation and terrorism and restructuring the National Security Council and Homeland Security Council.
RECOMMENDATION 9: Congress should reform its oversight both structurally and substantively to better address intelligence, homeland security, and crosscutting 21st-century national security missions such as the prevention of weapons of mass destruction proliferation and terrorism.
RECOMMENDATION 10: Accelerate integration of effort among the counterproliferation, counterterrorism, and law enforcement communities to address WMD proliferation and terrorism issues; strengthen expertise in the nuclear and biological fields; prioritize pre-service and in-service training and retention of people with critical scientific, language, and foreign area skills; and ensure that the threat posed by biological weapons remains among the highest national intelligence priorities for collection and analysis.
RECOMMENDATION 11: The United States must build a national security workforce for the 21st century. [clear need to increase funding and attention to science education and training]
RECOMMENDATION 12: U.S. counterterrorism strategy must more effectively counter the ideology behind WMD terrorism. The United States should develop a more coherent and sustained strategy and capabilities for global ideological engagement to prevent future recruits, supporters, and facilitators. [Soft power of development is vital and yet will remain under funded. Great rhetoric…pathetic follow up.]
Executive Summary: While the United States has had success in eliminating a number of terrorist leaders and foiling planned attacks, our government has invested less effort, let alone enjoyed success, at preventing the global
recruitment and ideological commitment of extremists who might seek to use nuclear or biological weapons against America or its allies. These efforts demand an approach far different from that used to capture or kill terrorists and facilitators. They require the tools of soft power, which include the ability to communicate persuasively about American intentions and to assist in promoting social and economic progress within those countries where the terrorists have a recruiting presence. Government agencies must think creatively to develop and coordinate efforts—ranging from strategic communications to targeted development assistance—to engage those who might otherwise be drawn to terrorist causes.
RECOMMENDATION 13: The next administration must work to openly and honestly engage the American citizen, encouraging a participatory approach to meeting the challenges of the new century. [This will work until the first bioweapons strike…and then its every man and family for themselves in the ensuing chaos. The U.S. military’s primary role in such an event will be crowd control, disease containment and clean up. ]
Labels: Bioterrorism, Nonproliferation
